看不懂的sol哥

2026机会多多

3Following

2.5Kfollowers

Feed

Livestream

Feed

Trading logic changes, Jensen Huang resigns, the big show is just beginning!! In November, Washington and Silicon Valley are filled with a bloody atmosphere. Just as the midterm elections settled and Trump and the Republicans lost the congressional majority almost simultaneously, a piece of news tore through the global tech community: Nvidia's board held a special meeting and officially approved Jensen Huang's resignation as CEO. The timing coincidence is as precise as a long-rehearsed script—the moment the election results landed, exposés targeting Jensen Huang came in waves, from his private life to board operations, from internal governance to old debts. The intensity of the attacks, the precise timing, and the ample ammunition suggest a determination not to stop until Jensen Huang is completely brought down. Most of these so-called "bombshells" are old stories, long no secret within Silicon Valley circles. The real question is: Why now? Why immediately after the election? Public opinion rarely ferments spontaneously like this—it is usually scattered, random, and unorganized. What we see here is a standard political purge: ammunition prepared long ago, coordinates set, just waiting for the trigger to be pulled. Once the midterm election gunshot fires, the hunt begins. To understand the essence of this turmoil, one must grasp the deep resentment within the Democratic camp toward Trump’s "long-standing bitterness." This resentment has accumulated layer upon layer, reaching a point where it must be vented. First, it is the hatred of elitism. During Trump's administration, large corporations received massive tax cuts, regulations were broadly relaxed, tech giants were allowed to monopolize and expand, and a batch of supergroups wealthy enough to rival nations was nurtured. Nvidia’s market value topping the world is the biggest beneficiary of this "national champion enterprise" policy. And Jensen Huang even emotionally praised in public forums that America’s unique institutional advantage in AI development comes from President Trump. This statement is both a loyalty pledge to Trump and a self-signed death warrant. In political purges, nothing stands out more than open loyalty as a target. Second, it is resentment over China policy. In the core battlefield of computing power in great power competition, the Democrats believe the Trump camp’s suppression of China was far from enough: export controls on high-end chips were frequently loosened, China’s large models quickly caught up by distilling U.S. technology, sanctions on key Chinese components like optical modules were delayed, ultimately leading to China’s computing power rising unexpectedly, gaining strength to rival the U.S. In Washington’s strategic narrative, Jensen Huang’s "close relationship" with the Chinese market is not business rationality but a matter of stance. The failure in computing power competition needs a scapegoat, and no one fits better than the king of the computing power empire. Third, it is the wrath of financial backers’ reckoning. Jensen Huang and figures like Musk used real money and platform resources to support Trump’s campaign, and opponents have kept this score in mind. The iron law of political struggle is: to bring down a person, first cut off their money; to tame a camp, first purge its financiers. Throughout history, new rulers always target financiers when changing power; the only difference is which one moves first. Fourth, it is the taboo of civilizational conflict. This is not convenient to say outright, but everyone knows it well. The Democrats, extremely sensitive to ideology and identity politics, fundamentally cannot accept that America’s core strategic lifeline—computing power—is controlled by an Asian. The civilizational conflicts described by Huntington won’t be recorded in official congressional hearings but will be the subtext of every personnel purge. Skin color and surname sometimes weigh more than performance and loyalty. Fifth, it is the chaos of Silicon Valley infighting. Nvidia is the center of the computing power empire, and Jensen Huang is its king. The GPU quotas in the king’s hands determine the fate of the vassals. The humiliation of downstream model giants queuing for chips and acting according to his mood has long bred deep resentment. It is said that this time the knife was handed by Anthropic. Once the king shows signs of weakness, the first to pounce are often not external enemies but the vassals who have pledged allegiance for years. This drama has been played from the Medici family to the Rockefellers, from The Merchant of Venice to The Wolf of Wall Street—the script never changes, only the actors. Therefore, it must be emphasized that Jensen Huang’s resignation turmoil is not the end of a tabloid story but the beginning of a seismic upheaval. Purging Jensen Huang is likely just the first domino to fall. After the midterm elections, the U.S. political and tech cycles resonate and overlap, inevitably leading to turbulent waves and flying black swans: the antitrust guillotine will fall, regulatory iron curtains on tech giants will tighten, China policy may escalate in a "who is tougher" direction, Silicon Valley’s power map will be redrawn, and Musk’s situation will likely be even more perilous than Jensen Huang’s. Financiers line up for purges, giants line up for dismemberment—this is the full picture of the great upheaval. For us, seeing the big picture is more important than betting on direction. In the chaos of great upheaval, any one-sided bet is gambling on luck, and the most rational strategy can be summarized simply: reduce exposure, control risk, and watch the show while sipping tea. There is no safe position in the eye of the storm; the chain reaction of political purges will erupt before the market prices it in. At this moment, preserving strength and shrinking the front line is more valuable than any offense. Of course, watching the show is not just idle observation—the internal strife of America’s computing power empire is precisely China’s most precious time window for computing power autonomy; the mutual tearing among Silicon Valley vassals is precisely the prelude to the global tech order’s reorganization. The end of an era is never a thunderous crash but quietly begins the moment the king is expelled from the palace. The silhouette of Jensen Huang walking out of Nvidia’s headquarters may well be the first frame of this seismic upheaval.

Jensen Huang has officially resigned! On November 12, NVIDIA's official website released a press statement confirming that Jensen Huang has resigned from his positions as President, CEO, and Director, effective immediately, with CFO Colette Kress appointed as interim CEO. The official wording used was "resigned," not "removed." This turned the previous day's rumors about the board possibly taking action into a fait accompli. Looking at the timeline, the pressure was cumulative. First, he admitted to employees that he was unfaithful to his wife, then The New York Times reported on his relationship with a direct subordinate (Vice President of Medical Business Kimberly Powell), compounded by the U.S. authorities' espionage suspicion regarding the related woman (Alice Huang) — though there has been no court ruling and no public acknowledgment of the second relationship by Jensen himself. These combined factors have gone beyond a "personal mistake" and directly touched on the company's code of conduct regarding conflicts of interest, as well as external concerns about national security. A few days ago, the board publicly stated they "still trusted him," but days later the official website issued the resignation statement, indicating internal deliberations had concluded. The interim CEO is Colette Kress, which aligns with prior market expectations. She joined NVIDIA in 2013 and has long been responsible for finance, capital allocation, and investor relations. She is currently the best candidate to quickly stabilize Wall Street, employees, and key customers. Her short-term tasks are clear: clarify financial guidance, reassure customers, and stabilize the team. NVIDIA lacks a true second-in-command; its flat structure makes the company highly dependent on Jensen Huang. Kress stepping in is currently the safest transitional solution. However, she is not the long-term answer. Kress's strength lies in stability, but her weakness is in technology and product foresight. The mid-to-long-term discussions still focus on technical leaders like Ian Buck — one of the core inventors of CUDA, directly responsible for key clients such as Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and OpenAI. Choosing Buck would mean preserving NVIDIA's most critical software moat. The board is likely to adopt a "Kress transition + internal technical team relay" approach for now. Whether they will make a formal appointment or bring in an external candidate depends on actions in the coming weeks. The impact on market value has already been partially priced in the short term. From the scandal's emergence to the official resignation, NVIDIA has lost hundreds of billions in market capitalization, with an over 8% drop after hours on November 11 due to removal rumors. After the official announcement, the market will enter a new pricing phase: on one hand, the resolution of uncertainty may bring short-term stabilization ("the worst news is out"); on the other hand, investors will immediately question whether NVIDIA without Jensen Huang can maintain its previous growth pace. Jensen Huang was not just the CEO; he was the final decision-maker on product direction, the core node in customer relationships, and one of Washington's most influential lobbyists. These capabilities are difficult to fully replace by one person or an interim team. If in the coming weeks Kress can stabilize financial expectations, key customers do not visibly shift to a wait-and-see stance, and the CUDA ecosystem and product cadence remain orderly, the stock price may gradually recover; conversely, if the succession process drags on, creates a vacuum, or customers and investors doubt technological continuity, operational risks could exceed previous governance risks. The earnings call on November 17 will be the first critical observation window. The most important issue now is not "he's gone," but "who will take over, how, and whether the transition will be stable." NVIDIA's moat remains, but its guardian has changed. The market will use orders, capital expenditures, and customer statements to reprice this new phase.

Is Nvidia going to change its CEO? 1️⃣ Currently, the possibility is no longer low. On November 8, Jensen Huang admitted to an affair, and the board publicly stated they "still trust him" and launched an independent investigation. But on November 11, The New York Times revealed a second relationship (with Kimberly Powell, the company's internal VP of medical business who reports directly to him), plus the first affair involved Alice Huang, who is suspected by the US side to be a Chinese spy. The nature of the matter changed. It escalated from a purely personal scandal to a conflict of interest and governance issue. Following this, media outlets like WSJ and Reuters reported that the board held a meeting on the evening of November 11 to discuss whether to remove him. Jensen Huang holds only about 3.6% of shares and does not have veto power. Prediction markets (Polymarket) once pushed the probability of "resignation or removal within the year" to over 80%. Of course, no official decision has been made yet, and the company has not confirmed anything, but the trend has clearly shifted. 2️⃣ Who is most likely to succeed? Nvidia's biggest problem is the lack of a true number two; the flat structure makes the company highly dependent on Jensen Huang alone. The safest short-term choice is CFO Colette Kress. She joined in 2013 and has long been responsible for finance and investor relations, well known on Wall Street. Some board members reportedly prefer to have her serve as interim CEO first to stabilize the market and the team. She can steady the situation but is not the type to continue leading the technical direction. In the mid to long term, Ian Buck is more favored. He is one of the main inventors of CUDA and currently leads the hyperscale computing business, directly interfacing with core clients like Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and OpenAI. Choosing him would mean preserving Nvidia's most critical software moat and customer relationships. On prediction markets, he and Kress often rank near the top. Other names (such as former Nvidia executive and current Arm CEO Rene Haas) have been mentioned but with significantly lower probability. The risk of an external hire is greater; the board is also looking for external candidates, but internal priority is higher. 3️⃣ Impact on market value Many bad news have already been priced in. Since the scandal broke, Nvidia has lost roughly $450 billion to $600 billion in market value from its early October peak. After-hours on November 11, due to removal rumors, the stock dropped over 8%, wiping out another two to three hundred billion dollars in a single day. Short-term volatility will continue, especially approaching the November 17 earnings report. The market fears not just the leadership change itself but the loss of Jensen Huang’s combination of "forward-looking judgment + customer relationships + Washington lobbying," raising concerns whether customers will hesitate and whether capital expenditure rhythms will be affected. In the mid to long term, it depends on the quality of succession. If Kress transitions first and the technical team (especially the Buck line) remains stable, the market may have a chance to reprice; if the succession process is chaotic or product cadence or the CUDA ecosystem is questioned, then "operational risk" could be greater than the current "governance risk." Analysts often say, "Jensen Huang is Nvidia." Losing him is a big deal, but the company's orders and ecosystem lock-in won't disappear instantly. Currently, it is still "under serious consideration," not "already decided." In the next few days to one or two weeks, the board’s statements and clarity on the succession plan will directly determine the stock price movement.

Sun Yuchen: How can ordinary people earn their own 10 million?? Sun Yuchen, born in 1990, had 100,000 RMB in 2013. He didn’t buy a house, nor did he save money in the bank. Instead, he divided the 100,000 into three equal parts and bought Bitcoin, Tesla, and Vipshop. One year later, the 100,000 turned into 1 million... Since then, he made a comeback and became a major investment figure. Many people don’t like Sun Yuchen’s style, but when it comes to making money, he indeed has his own methodology. He has shared multiple times how ordinary people can earn 10 million. In his view, making 10 million never relies on hard work or physical labor; the core is choosing the right track + leveraging + sticking to the track and staying at the table. Specifically, you must do these 5 things well: 1️⃣ Persistently focus on the track before its explosive growth. Don’t chase industries that are already widely known—that’s a game for the bag holders. Find the critical point where the public doesn’t quite understand it yet, but the trend has emerged—like Bitcoin in 2013, new energy in 2019. Too early and you get burned, too late and you become a chump. Timing is more important than effort. 2️⃣ The industry must be capable of long-term high-speed growth. His standard is: at least 20% growth per year, continuously for 10 years. This threshold filters out most tracks. Many people choose industries based only on current hype, ignoring the ceiling five years later. What truly lets you accumulate 10 million is a long slope with deep snow, not a fleeting bloom. 3️⃣ The business model must be replicable. Things that can’t be standardized or streamlined have an upper limit defined by your own time and energy. You always earn personal money, not system money. Only what can be replicated has the potential to scale. 4️⃣ Choose necessities. Necessities aren’t just food, clothing, housing, transportation, but also human emotions and desires—vanity, laziness, social needs, the desire to be recognized. Whoever can find an entry point in these areas is more likely to build a big business. 5️⃣ Suit yourself. No matter how good the industry is, if you don’t understand it or can’t do it, that 10 million belongs to someone else. You must at least have one capability to handle things—technology, content, operations, sales—at least one. Finally, Sun Yuchen reveals the biggest wealth misconception for ordinary people: it’s not that you invest after you have money, but that you have money because you invest. His youthful comeback never relied on strong capital, but on finding the right track, cleverly using leverage, and sticking to the underlying logic of the track. In fact, what ordinary people lack to reach 10 million is not capital or luck, but the courage to break fixed thinking and precise wealth awareness. Quit the fixed mindset of stable employment, plan and choose from an investor’s perspective, go with the flow, and the 10 million goal will eventually be reached.

15 Books on Dividends I've Thoroughly Read Before I Dare to Speak There are plenty of people talking about dividends, but very few actually read the books. Many just say "buy dividends, hold, and wait for the payout," but if you ask "where does that idea come from?" they get stuck. Over the past few years, I've gone through quite a few books. The ones truly solid and worth revisiting are these 15. 1. First, understand one thing: Are dividends really money? 1. "The Theory of Investment Value" by John Burr Williams An old book from 1938, the "constitution" of dividend investing. The core idea is simple—how much a stock is worth depends on how much dividend it can pay, not on how much profit is shown on the books. 2. "The Future for Investors" by Jeremy Siegel He analyzed data from 1871 to 2003 and came to a startling conclusion: after adjusting for inflation, 97% of the returns from U.S. stocks actually came from reinvested dividends. Stocks that don’t pay dividends aren’t as attractive in the long run as people imagine. 3. "Stocks for the Long Run" by Jeremy Siegel Still him. The long-term real annualized return of U.S. stocks is about 6.5%–7%. When you say "hold on," you need to have this number in mind as a baseline, or you’ll run away after a couple of weeks of decline. 2. How to pick and whether it’s expensive 4. "The Dividend Detective" by Lowell Miller She said something I still remember: profits can be manipulated, but dividends are real cash paid to you. She doesn’t compare who has the highest dividend yield but makes you look at the company’s dividend range over the past few years—where it stands now. 5. "The Best Investment" by Jeremy J. Siegel Total return ≈ dividend yield + dividend growth rate. Both numbers are there, so you don’t have to guess if the economy will be good next year. 6. "The Little Book of Big Dividends" by Charles B. Carlson He repeatedly emphasizes a counterintuitive point: first ask if the dividend is safe, then talk about yield. When the dividend yield is very high, it’s often not a gift but a warning. 3. How people who have actually managed money write 7. "John Neff on Investing" by John Neff Windsor Fund’s 31-year annualized return was 13.7%. His approach boils down to low P/E ratio + dividend yield higher than the market. It’s a bit dumb but effective. 8. "Beating the Dow" by Peter O’Shaughnessy A 1991 book, the "Dogs of the Dow" theory comes from here. 9. "Get Rich with Dividends" by Marc Lichtenfeld The 10-11-12 rule. Basically, buy companies whose dividends increase year after year, don’t just focus on how much they pay now. 4. Why you just can’t hold on 10. "The Intelligent Investor" by Benjamin Graham In the short term, the market is a voting machine; in the long term, it’s a weighing machine. This quote is overused, but you’ll remember it when the market drops. 11. "The Psychology of Money" by Morgan Housel This book doesn’t talk much about yields; it talks about why people always make stupid decisions with money. 12. "Cycles" by Edward R. Dewey and Edwin F. Dakin They don’t claim to predict, but say you need to know where you stand in the cycle. 5. Friendly recommendations for mainland players 13. "Index Fund Investment Guide" by Luosiding How to choose dividend indexes, how to look at valuation percentiles—just follow it, good enough for beginners. 14. "The Simplest Thing in Investing" by Qiu Guolu Cheap is the hard truth. No fancy stuff. 15. "Common Sense on Mutual Funds" by John C. Bogle Recommended multiple times by Warren Buffett. What you end up with is actually the part of fees you didn’t pay. For beginners, finish the first three books to understand "are dividends really income," so you won’t go off track later. If you always can’t hold on, read the fourth category. If you don’t know where to put your first money, look at the fifth category. One more thing: four of these books currently don’t have Simplified Chinese editions—"The Dividend Detective," "The Best Investment," "Get Rich with Dividends," and "Beating the Dow." If someone asks, just say the original title; don’t make up publishers, it’s easy to get caught. Finally, a practical note: books won’t pay your dividends for you. But they can help you understand where those dividends come from and whether they’re reliable.

Why must young people stay away from A-shares and go all-in on U.S. stocks?? With the same amount of money, A-shares need to double twice as fast. With the same amount of money invested in two places, how much difference will there be after twenty years? The answer depends on where you start counting from. From early 2010 to the end of 2024, the S&P 500 total return index annualized 13.9%. In the same period, the CSI 300 total return index annualized 2.8%. Over fifteen years, the cumulative difference is more than four times. Change the starting point, and the conclusion changes. From 2006 to 2025, the S&P 500 total return annualized 10.8%, CSI 300 total return annualized 10.5%. Basically even. The same pair of indices, two sets of data, both true. The difference lies in the starting point. 2006 was before the bull market started, with low valuations. 2010 was after the bubble burst, with the CSI 300 starting valuation at 28.5 times. So the real question is not whether A-shares can rise. They have risen, and not slowly. The question is whether you can get on at the right position and hold on at the right position. 1. Where the money leaks from Breaking down returns makes things clearer. From 1990 to 2024, a span of thirty-five years, the S&P 500 annualized 10.6%, with corporate earnings contributing 6.3%, dividends and buybacks 2.1%, and valuation uplift 1.9%. From 2010 to 2024, the CSI 300 annualized 2.8%, with earnings contributing 6.1%, dividends and buybacks 2.1%, valuation change -5.1%. Different periods, looking at structure. Earnings and dividends on both sides are almost the same; the difference is in the last column. U.S. stock valuations add 1.9 points per year; A-shares subtract 5.1 points per year. One adds, one subtracts, seven points lost. These seven points are not from companies earning less. It's the price the market is willing to pay, which keeps going down. 2. Who is suppressing the valuation In 2007, 2009, and 2015, the three bull market peaks of A-shares, the Wind All A excluding financial and petrochemical sectors had P/E ratios of 68.7, 75.6, and 65.1 times respectively. In the same period, the S&P 500 P/E ratio from 2005 to 2022 was basically between 15 and 25 times. The 2021 bull market peak just passed 40 times. Starting too high means paying the debt for the next decade-plus. U.S. stocks are not bubble-free. The Nasdaq dropped 80% in 2000. But the S&P 500 valuation center has long been between 15 and 25 times; bubbles burst but can recover. A-shares' valuation center has been continuously pushed down by new stocks and share reductions. 3. Volatility itself is a cost In the past twenty years, the CSI 300 annualized volatility was 26.7%, the S&P 500 14.5%. From 2005 to 2022, the CSI 300 had six drawdowns over 30%, the deepest 72.3%. The S&P 500 had only two, the deepest 56.8%. The same amount of money faces twice the volatility in A-shares compared to the S&P. This is where ordinary people lose money. The index is not wrong; people just can't hold on. When it drops 70%, the account number is less than half. At this time, telling you not to move and to keep investing regularly relies not on knowledge but on your heartbeat. The S&P also falls. It dropped 57% in 2008, and at most 25% in 2022. But it recovers after falling, and quickly. A-shares have often fallen and then stayed down for years. The same money pays more in time. 4. The pool needs water replacement Long-term returns of an index depend not only on who is included but also on who is removed. In 2025, 31 companies were delisted from A-shares. In 2024, 52 companies, the highest in history. In U.S. stocks, from 2010 to 2023, about 400 companies delisted annually on average. A-shares have over 5,000 listed companies, with about thirty delisted per year. This pool fills quickly but drains slowly. Bad companies staying in the pool dilute everyone's returns. The index does not automatically refresh; it depends on selection and timing. The S&P 500 does not need this. Companies that can't survive leave on their own; those with falling weights automatically decrease. The index committee only does one thing: replace the unqualified. 5. Fast extraction, slow return In the first half of 2026, major shareholders in A-shares reduced holdings by 489.4 billion yuan, already exceeding the whole of 2025. Dividends in the same period were 924.5 billion yuan. Dividends are indeed more than reductions. This must be acknowledged; you can't say this market only extracts without returning. But the rhythm is uneven. Dividends come once a year; reductions are announced anytime, often at high stock prices. For holders, bad news always arrives first; good news always arrives later. 6. Finally, what lands in the account In 2025, the Shanghai Composite Index rose 18.41%, CSI 300 rose 17.66%. The average return for A-share retail investors was -23.6%, with an average loss of 21,000 yuan. Only 18.9% of accounts were profitable. The index rises, accounts lose money. Both can be true simultaneously. The reason is simple. The index does not panic sell on crash days; people do. The index does not leverage; people do. The index does not chase highs because neighbor Wang made money; people do. So why buy the S&P? It doesn't rise the fastest. From 2006 to 2025, it only outpaced the CSI 300 by 0.3 points. Buying it means buying a smoother path. Half the volatility, shallower drawdowns, stable valuation center, delisting mechanism refreshing the pool for you. You only need to make one decision: buy in and then don't move. In A-shares, you need to make two decisions: when to buy, when to sell. More decisions mean more chances to make mistakes. And people making mistakes is normal. This is not to say A-shares have no good companies. There are always good companies, and many. It means for an ordinary person, relying on regular investing and holding on, making money in A-shares is much harder than in the S&P. This difficulty is only half about stock picking; the rest is about enduring. The S&P is not without risk. It dropped 25% at most in 2022, 57% in 2008. It can halve and cause sleepless nights. And in the past fifteen years of high returns, 1.9 points came from valuation uplift. This part cannot last forever. But its underlying logic is simple. Earnings grow, dividends are paid, bad companies are removed. These three things are much easier than guessing a market top correctly. My own approach is simple. Core holdings in the S&P. Whether optimistic or not is one thing. Whether to use your own hands to catch that volatility is another.